We analyze a mutual re insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a re and how payments are apportioned among other households. The only Pareto e cient allocation reachable through the mechanism requires that all households honestly report the true value of their property. However, such honest reporting is not an equilibrium except in the extreme case where the property values are identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, the bene ts from deviating from truthful reporting vanish, and all of the non-degenerate equilibria of the mechanism are nearly truthful and approximately Pareto e cient.
Introduction
Mutual insurance companies write large proportions of insurance policies in many sectors. 1 They have been very successful for several reasons. First, as Malinvaud (1973) points out, future markets provide only a remote idealization to the actual mechanism for risk allocation since \the ideal market system is too costly to implement." On the contrary, pooling individual risk by means of mutual insurance policies \permits substantial economizing on market transactions" (Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu, 1996) . Another important reason for the success of mutual insurance is that they can solve through peer monitoring some moral hazard problems that plague incorporated insurance companies. 2 3 While these problems are well understood, mutual insurance arrangements also solve other informational problems relating to the discovery of the value of insured property, as we show here.
In this paper we present and analyze a real-life mutual re insurance mechanism that has been functioning in a rural mountainous area of Western Europe for well over a century and a half. In this mechanism, called La Crema in the local language, each participating household must report a value. In case there is a re, the owner of the burned household receives her reported value, which is paid by all participating households (including herself) in proportion to their reported values. We focus on the rules of La Crema because they are particularly clear from a game-theoretic point of view, they are by no means exceptional, and the mechanism has some remarkable properties. 4 In particular, the properties of the La Crema mechanism that we explore concern its e ciency characteristics and the incentives it provides for truthful reporting of property values. One important characteristic is that the mechanism allows for announcement of any value by households and does not seek any appraisal or cross-report by any witnesses. This is potentially a nice feature because it could allow the mechanism to insure the \subjective" value of property (as a welfarist would like), rather than the appraisable market value. The subjective value can include sentimental factors which could not be 1 \Advance premium mutuals write almost 40 percent of the life insurance in force and almost 23 percent of the property and liability insurance premiums." (Williams, Smith and Young, 1998) .
2 \Mutuals seem to have been more e ective than stock companies in constructing such incentive systems, particularly in the early phases of their history. Individual industrialists were sometimes large enough to make investment in research on re prevention worthwhile, but stock companies discouraged the provision of public goods by appropriating too much of the saving from decreased re losses" (Heiner, 1985) . 3 Obviously, mutuals have problems of their own, or they would be the only organizational form. \From a nancial perspective, the key impediment to mutual life company stability, growth and development, is that equity capital can be raised only through retained earnings from the company's operations," (Garber, 1993) . Also, mutuals are very di cult to take over, which makes the corporate governance problem harder to solve, especially in large mutuals. 4 A similar proportion rule is adopted, for instance, in marine insurance clubs: \At the beginning of the year the shipowners are given an estimate of the amount (call) they will be required to pay into the Protection and Indemnity] Club. However, the eventual call is dependent upon the claim made by all members: each member knows only the proportion emphasis in the original] of the total cost they will be required to bear." (Bennett, 2000) .
valued appropriately by the market. This additional feature of the mechanism will only be useful if the mechanism provides incentives to (approximately) announce truthfully and provides for e cient risk sharing. We will see that, under appropriate conditions, the mechanism performs these tasks quite well, and without having to resort to audits or other forms of \independent" assessments. Let us now discuss the mechanism's performance in more detail.
With regards to e ciency, the mechanism places strong constraints on the possible risk sharing that can take place since reimbursements and payments are both scaled directly in terms of the announced property values. For instance, if households have constant (and identical) relative risk aversion, the only Pareto e cient allocation that is reachable through the game requires that all households truthfully report the value of their property. Things are even worse with constant (and identical) absolute risk aversion as then no Pareto e cient allocation is obtainable as an outcome in the game regardless of how the announcements are varied. 5 With regards to the incentives that the mechanism provides for truthful reporting of property values, we show that there is an equilibrium where all households report the true value of their insured property if and only if these valuations are exactly the same across households. Apart from this extreme case of identical property values, we show that households with relatively high property values have an incentive to overreport their value (to increase reimbursement from others when needed) and households with low property values have an incentive to underreport their value (to decrease payment to others when asked for).
The analysis described above appears to be in con ict with the conventional wisdom among the actual participants in the game, who are happy with the functioning of the mechanism and consider that the only natural thing one can do is to report the true value of the property. Since the mechanism has existed for a long time one would think that tradition or their own experience could furnish enough information for agents to know their best response. In fact, the incentive and e ciency properties that the mechanism exhibits are quite appealing and closely in line with local wisdom once we examine large enough societies and consider approximate rather than exact e ciency.
From the perspective of larger societies, we rst show that households in large enough societies have arbitrarily small incentives to deviate from honest reporting, or in other words, truth is an "-Nash equilibrium. Second, we show that in large enough societies, the (exact) Nash equilibria of the La Crema mechanism involve reports that are arbitrarily close to the truth. 6 Third, the Nash equilibria (and "-Nash equilibria) are arbitrarily close to being Pareto e cient in large enough societies. Finally, we show that for reasonable parameterizations of utility functions what is needed in the above statements in terms of \large enough" societies, can actually be reasonably small. Moreover, these results are robust to variations in the informational structure as they hold both with complete and with private information.
The interest of this institution is manifold, and quite di erent from other studies of risk sharing institutions. 7 First of all, the La Crema institution refers to a specialized type of risk, which limits the potential explanations for observed behavior. Secondly, the transfer rules are quite explicit and regulated. Finally, the rural society under consideration is relatively rich during the whole period of the mechanism's operation (for example, there are no instances of famines during its existence). The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the mechanism (informally and formally) and gives some background on the society where the institution operates. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium and e ciency properties of the mechanism. Section 4 provides results characterizing the equilibria and approximate e ciency of the mechanism in \large" societies. Section 5 concludes.
La Crema

The institution of La Crema
In 1882, and under the initiative of the local priest, the 102 farms of Canillo in Principality of Andorra 8 organized themselves into a re insurance cooperative named La Crema. By that time, Andorra was mostly a rural area living in quasi-autarchy, and La Crema was conceived as a risk-sharing institution to cope with re damages that were a source of major worries to farmers in mountainous Canillo where sinuous and steep roads did not allow for quick nor e ective re brigades. Since its early beginnings, the role of La Crema was twofold: as a logistic structure, to organize the local reman forces; as a nancial structure, to guarantee pecuniary compensations to farms su ering re destructions. 9 The organization of La Crema is as follows. Once a year, the cooperative members meet in a general assembly, the consell de La Crema (La Crema council). The meeting is xed on the Sunday that falls two weeks before the carnival and attendance is compulsory 7 Such as the ones mentioned in McCloskey (1989), Townsend (1993) or Fafchamps (1999) . Loury (1993, 1994) examine the allocative performance of a simple, easily organized and widely observed institution for nancial intermediation called rosca (rotating savings and credit associations). 8 The Principality of Andorra, located in the heart of the Pyrenees between France and Spain, is both one of the smallest and the oldest states in Western Europe: the national territory is 468 km 2 and today's frontiers were de nitely settled in 1278. The country is divided administratively into seven parishes: Canillo, Ordino, La Massana, Encamp, Andorra la Vella, Sant Juli a de L oria and Escaldes-Engordany. Agriculture has been the major economic activity of Andorra until the end of the 19 th century; tourism, commerce and nancial services are now the basic national economic activities. In 1999, the GDP per capita was 20,252 $. See http://www.turisme.ad/angles/index.htm for more details. 9 La Crema is still active and intervened recently to nancially compensate Cal Soldevila whose barn partially burned in August of 1998 and Cal Batista for similar damages in July of 1985.
5 for all members. 10 The meeting is supervised by two permanent secretaris (secretaries) who are elected for life. During this general assembly, each farmer announces a value for each of the building that he or she owns (farm, barn, cow-shed, stable, etc.). Conventional wisdom suggests that farmers report the true and total value of their property, and La Crema cooperative members typically do so. This amount is noted in three di erent books: each secretari keeps a copy at home and a third book is stored at the parish townhall. 11 In the case of a re, the owner of the damaged building receives a compensation equal at most to the value noted in the book for the current year, depending on the extent of the damages. This nancial compensation is made by the other cooperative members, who pay in proportion to the share their own announced property value represents with respect to the total of all values announced by the La Crema members. An early reference and brief description of the La Crema transfer rule can also be found in Brutails (1904) : \Comme dans toute les populations aux prises avec une nature ingrate, la solidarit e est d evelopp ee parmi les Andorrans; elle a donn e naissance a des soci et es d'assurances mutuelles contre l'incendie. Les soci et es d'assurances sont g en eralement ouvertes aux habitants d'un village; les associ es peuvent refuser d'admettre au b en e ce de l'assurance les immeubles dont les risques d epassent la moyenne. En cas de sinistre, chacun paie, pour indemniser le propri etaire, au prorata de la somme pour laquelle lui-même est assur e" (p. 42). 12 During the yearly meeting, four comissionats (commissioners) and three recaudadors (money-collectors) are elected for one year. The comissionats are responsible for the logistic and technical activities. First, they guarantee that all cooperative members take the appropriate precautionary measures to prevent possible res by reporting to the consell de La Crema carelessness in farm and building maintenance and to report any problematic behavior. Second, they are in charge of the re ghting material owned by the cooperative ( re-hoses, etc.). Finally, in case of re, the comissionats x, in accordance with the concerned farmer, the total value of the damages to be reimbursed (depending on the extent of the damages and not exceeding the value noted in the book) and submit it to the consell for approval. The three elected recaudadors represent each a di erent geographical area: Canillo, la Ribera and Prats. 13 In case of re, and once the amount to be transferred to the damaged farm is xed by the consell under proposition of the comissionats, the recaudadors are responsible for collecting the contributions of the La Crema members within their area of intervention.
In the formal game theoretic analysis we are going to focus on the incentives to report truthfully the value of the property. As we mention in the introduction, the relevant valuation here is the individual subjective value, which may be very di erent from the market valuation. Because of this, there is quite a lot of freedom in the mechanism for reporting valuations. Unfortunately, this implies that there may be incentives to over-insure your property and then burn it. If players can commit arson (and not be caught), that would completely destroy any possibilities for any insurance (La Crema or otherwise), which is why commercial rms typically disallow insuring a property above its market price. Deterrents to arson are twofold: as for other insurance arrangements, there is a chance of being caught and su er severe penalties (long prison terms). But La Crema, as other mutual insurance arrangements, also adds another dimension that a commercial or market based insurance scheme would not: given that each household is insured by their neighbors, the neighbors have an added incentive to monitor the behavior of a given household to make sure that they abide by the re codes (and do not commit arson!).
The La Crema game
There is a set N of households, with jNj = n. Each household has a utility function u i and a wealth w i 2 c; C] where C c > 0. Let W = P i2N w i . 14 We take each u i to be twice continuously di erentiable and strictly concave. Let S = 2 N be the set of possible states. In particular, s 2 S is a list of farms that burned. For instance, s = f2; 7; 12g denotes that farms 2, 7 and 12 (and only those farms) burned. Let S (k) = fs j #s = kg be the set of states where exactly k farms burn.
Note that S = n k=0 S (k) . For any i 2 N, let S i denote the set of states for which farm i burns (perhaps along with some other farms), and S (k) i be the set of states for which k farms in addition to farm i burn. Let p s be the probability of state s. We assume that all states where an identical number k of farms burn are equally likely. That is, for all s; s 0 2 S (k) , p s = p s 0 and we denote this probability by p k . 15 A special case of this is where each farm burns with an independent and identical probability. Note, however, that it is not required that the burnings be independent. As an extreme example, it could be that p 0 > 0 and p n > 0 and p k = 0 for all other k. This might be an example where all the farms lie close to each other in a forest, so that either all farms burn or none burns. All we assume is that p k > 0 for some k > 0, so that there is some chance of a re.
We now describe formally the rules of the La Crema game. 3 Discussion of the game
Equilibria
The rst proposition says that truthful announcements are a Nash equilibrium only in the case where all wealths are identical.
Proposition 1 The La Crema game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where m i = w i for all i 2 N if and only if w i = w j , 8i; j 2 N.
The proof of Proposition 1 appears in the appendix. The intuition behind the Proposition is roughly as follows. Increasing m i has two e ects. First, it increases the reimbursement that household i receives in the case of a re that consumes i's property. Second, it increases the liability that i faces in the event that some other household's property burns. Some heuristic calculations help illustrate the relative size of these two e ects and the incentives that households have as a result. For simplicity, consider a situation where at most one household will have a re, and so we need only consider states of the form 16 The upper bound on announcements is arbitrarily set at twice the highest imaginable property value. Any upper bound would do. 17 The state where no farm burns has no impact since no payments are made. States where several farms burn have analogous calculations as those discussed here, as the consideration is what happens if i's farm burns versus some other farm burns (on the margin).
the households' wealths are evenly spread across these states and they have no incentives to change their announcements. Next, consider the case where households do not have the same wealth. Order them so that w n w n?1 w 1 , and w n > w 1 with below average property value will bene t from underreporting, and those with above average property value will bene t from overreporting.
The proposition tells us that the game does not have an equilibrium where households report the true value of their property if there is any heterogeneity in household value. The case of heterogeneity is arguably the interesting case, as it would be hard to see the reason for an elaborate mechanism (which is not costless to administer) unless there were some kind of heterogeneity. Otherwise, there would be common knowledge precisely about the thing that the coordinator is trying to elucidate.
This result still holds when there is private information about property values. All that is needed (this is clear from the proof as well as in the intuition above) is for some households to be fairly sure that they have the top or bottom property value (or that they are close to either).
The following remark shows that the problem goes even further. When there are only two households, there is no interior pure-strategy equilibrium to the game at all. Either both households refuse to participate (there is always such a degenerate equilibrium where neither household declares any wealth given the expectation that the other will not), or the wealthier household has such a strong incentive to overreport that they report the maximum allowed property value. It is hard to see what an insurance mechanism is trying to accomplish if it leads to such extreme outcomes.
Before providing an answer to this paradox, let us examine the Pareto e ciency characteristics of the La Crema game. We show that even in this special case the only Pareto e cient 18 allocations that can be reached as outcomes of the La Crema game arise from reporting the true value of one's household. The reason is that equality of marginal rates of substitution across states of the world requires that ratios of consumption are equalized for all states of the world. This can only happen when households report the true value of the property. We note that Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the only Pareto e cient outcome of the La Crema game (under identical constant relative risk aversion) cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium.
E ciency
Given that (Arrow-Debreu complete market) Walrasian outcomes are e cient, an interesting question in this context is whether the unique Pareto e cient outcome reachable through the La Crema game (when households have identical CRRA utility functions) corresponds to the Arrow-Debreu complete market Walrasian equilibrium of this economy when the endowments for the household i are w i in state s = 2 S i and 0 in states S i : The following proposition shows that this is generically not the case.
Remark 2 Let the probability of any farm burning be given by p > 0 and have this probability be independent across farms. If there exist k and j such that w k 6 = w j , then the unique Pareto e cient allocation reachable through the La Crema game when the players have identical CRRA utility functions, is di erent from the outcome of the complete market Walrasian equilibrium of the La Crema economy.
The next proposition shows that if agents have CARA utility functions, then di culties in reaching e ciency are even worse for the La Crema game in that all of the allocations that are reachable through the game are ine cient. The reason is that Pareto optimality with identical CARA utility functions requires that di erences in utilities across states of the world are equalized across agents. This demands on the one hand that reports are the same for all agents, and at the same time that they are truthful. With heterogeneous endowments the two requirements are not compatible. Proposition 3 If for some i; j 2 N, w i 6 = w j and households have identical CARA utility functions, then there is no Pareto e cient allocation that can be reached through the La Crema game.
The following remark shows that di erences in risk attitudes across households will not help to explain the ine ciency of the La Crema game. This is evident when the probability of no property burning is di erent from zero (p 0 > 0), because in that case Pareto e ciency requires transfers from the relatively more risk averse agents to the relatively less risk averse agents when no property burns (i.e., in state s 2 S . The remark shows that even if there were some household burning in all states of the world (p 0 = 0), there would still be no Pareto e cient outcome of the game.
Remark 3 Assume that n 3, that household i = 1 is risk neutral, the other households have (possibly heterogeneous) CRRA utility functions, and for some i; j 2 N, w i 6 = w j , then there is no Pareto e cient allocation that is obtainable through the La Crema game.
The above results leave us with a puzzle that needs to be explained. Pareto e ciency can only be obtained through the La Crema game in some extreme cases, and even then the corresponding allocation cannot be sustained as an equilibrium of this game as long as there is any heterogeneity in household property values. So why would the La Crema game be used? An analysis of larger societies provides an answer.
Larger Societies
While Proposition 1 shows that truth is only a Nash equilibrium in extreme (and implausible) situations, the La Crema game still has very nice features in terms of its equilibrium structure and e ciency characteristics. We point these out in a series of propositions. First, we show that truth is an "-Nash equilibrium for large enough societies. Thus, the gains from over or understating one's wealth are not large. While this suggests that the La Crema game will have nice properties, it is not completely convincing since it does not guarantee that the exact Nash equilibria will be close to truthful. Second, we show that there always exist (non-degenerate) Nash equilibria. Third, we show that all nondegenerate Nash equilibria are close to truthful in large societies. Thus, the La Crema game provides incentives for individuals to play (approximately) truthfully. Finally, we show that truth and all announcements close to truth are approximately Pareto e cient (with arbitrary utility functions). Taken together these results show that the Nash equilibria and "-Nash equilibria of the La Crema game are approximately e cient in large societies with arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences and endowments.
In order to talk about large societies and approximation, we consider the following setting. Let n (A1) implies that the second derivative of utility functions has some bound that applies to all players and games. 19 In other words, players are not arbitrarily risk averse. Note that no particular form is assumed for the utility functions u i ? so they can di er across people as long as there is an upper bound on how risk averse people are. 19 Note that this assumption trivially holds in the CRRA case as long as the is bounded from above. 20 When we have more than two farms burning at a time, the argument becomes a bit more complicated, Let us stress an important feature of the result in Proposition 4. The bounds we use in the proof are robust to the information structure and the actions of the other agents. That is, they do not depend on the p k 's, what the w j 's are for j 6 = i, and work uniformly across i's so long as (A1) is satis ed.
Approximate Equilibria
21
In fact, all that is needed is that a household believes that their property value will be a relatively small amount of the total announced property value to have truth be nearly a best response. This robustness is important not just for realism's sake. In an environment with complete information there are formal mechanisms which implement \exactly" the e cient outcome, but this is not the case with incomplete information.
Example 1: There is a population of 100 households who each have the same preferences, u i (c i ) = p c i . The households di er in the value of their properties: half are of a \low" type with w L = 10000 and the other half are of a \high" type with w H = 30000. Let the probability that a re burns a given property be 1/100, and be such that exactly one house burns.
22
This allows for easy calculations, and is not much di erent from the i.i.d. case in terms of incentives and expected utilities. In this case, if other households are reporting truthfully, then a low type's best response is approximately m i = 9925, and the gain in expected utility of announcing 9925 compared to 10000 is approximately 10 ?5 out of an expected utility of approximately 99.5, which is a gain of about only 10 ?5 %. To put this in perspective, not participating leads to an expected utility of 99, and so the overall bene t of participating in La Crema is about .5. Thus, the gain of an optimal deviation from truth is very small even compared to the overall bene t from participation (10 ?5 =:5). Similar calculations for the high type lead to a best response (to truth by the others) of m i = 30077 and a similar sized gain (on the order of 10 ?5 ) compared to truthful announcing. Table 1 summarizes the results with these parameters for di erent population sizes. The results for u i (c i ) = c :9 i and u i (c i ) = c :1 i are given in tables 2 and 3 respectively. For more risk averse u i than the ones we give, the di erences between truth and best response are even smaller, and notice that the usual estimated values for the Arrow-Pratt 21 The proof uses the fact that p s 's are equal across s's of the same size. We are not sure how the mechanism performs if there are drastic disparities in the probability of res across properties. Regardless, La Crema could be made to work in such cases by separating properties into relatively homogeneous risk categories operating the mechanism separately over di erent risk categories, especially as much of the bene ts can still be realized with relatively small numbers. 22 So, p 1 = 1 100 and p k = 0 for k 6 = 1, where recall that p k is the probability of each state where exactly k farms burn. 
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Equilibria
While Proposition 4 is somewhat reassuring that truthful reporting of property values can reasonably be expected in the La Crema game, it leaves open the possibility that the actual equilibrium could still be quite far from truthful. (Note that generally "-Nash equilibria need not be near Nash equilibria.) As we now show, however, the Nash equilibria of the La Crema game are in fact close to being truthful.
Before we proceed, note that (0; : : :; 0) is always an equilibrium of the La Crema game. We call this the degenerate equilibrium. Say that an equilibrium is non-degenerate if there is some player i who places probability less than 1 on playing m i = 0. It can be shown that any strategy where m i < w i =2 is weakly dominated, and so the only equilibria that do not involve weakly dominated strategies must have m i w i =2 (as is shown in the appendix following equation (8) 24 ). In fact, the following propositions show that non-degenerate equilibria exist and have some strong properties.
Proposition 5 There exists a non-degenerate Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game.
Moreover, there exists a strict Nash equilibrium (and thus in pure and undominated strate- The proof of proposition 6 follows similar intuition as that behind Proposition 4. We know that the gain from misreporting is small in a large society, and the proof uses the strict concavity of u i to show that grossly misreporting cannot be a best response: if it involves gross underreporting then there are substantial gains in insurance to be realized by increasing the report, and if it involves gross overreporting then there the household is overexposed in their liability and they bene t from decreasing the report.
Propositions 4, 5, and 6 provide a resolution to the seeming con ict between the observation that with heterogeneous societies truthful reporting is not an equilibrium of the La Crema game, and the conventional wisdom among the actual participants of the game who think that it is best to report the true value of the property. These previous propositions establish that there exist strict 25 Nash equilibria that are non-degenerate and that any non-degenerate equilibrium of the mechanism is \close" to truthful reporting, and gets closer the bigger the society.
Approximate E ciency
While the above results resolve the incentive part of the paradox of the La Crema game, the e ciency characteristics are still somewhat puzzling, as with in many cases fully Pareto e cient allocations are not obtainable as an outcome of the game, even under truthful reporting. As it turns out, however, the allocation that results from truthful reporting is close to being e cient in large societies (even with heterogeneous preferences), and thus so are the outcomes associated with non-degenerate equilibria. This is formalized as follows.
Consider a sequence of economies N h in the La Crema game satisfying (A1). Normalize utility functions so that that u i (0) = 0 for each h and i 2 N h . Furthermore, suppose that there exists a > 0 and a > 0 such that (A2) a > u 0 i (x) > a for all x 2 0; 2C], h, and i 2 N h .
Condition (A2) bounds the derivative of u i uniformly across i.
Proposition 7 Consider a sequence of economies N h in the La Crema game as described above (satisfying (A1) and (A2)). Let the probability of any farm burning be given by p > 0 and have this probability be independent across farms.
( 
The proof of Proposition 7 uses a Law of Large Numbers to tie down the expected property damage to the society. This means that the insurance problem can be approximated by a situation where a given household has a good idea of the cost of insurance and faces only its idiosyncratic risk of loss of property. In such a situation, truthful announcements lead to approximately e cient outcomes, and so non-degenerate equilibria (which are approximately truthful) are also approximately e cient.
Conclusions
We have shown that true reporting leads to the unique Pareto e cient outcome of the La Crema game, but the corresponding allocation cannot be sustained as an exact equilibrium of this game as long as there is some heterogeneity in household value. However, we have also shown that if the society is large enough, true reporting is \almost" optimal, and that the non-degenerate equilibria of the game lead to outcomes that are close to being Pareto e cient. It is worth remarking that this e cient solution has been attained by a contractual mechanism which is also relatively simple.
Although the framework studied here is one with complete information about the valuations, these results hold even with private information. Truthful reporting is not an equilibrium as long as some agents know that they are likely to have the highest or lowest wealth. But in a large society, deviations will be small, if household believe that their property value will be a relatively small amount of the total announced property value. This robustness with respect to the information structure is important not just because it is more realistic. With complete information there are formal mechanisms which implement \exactly" the e cient outcome, but this is not the case with incomplete information.
Mutual institutions with proportional payment/reimbursement rules are, as we discuss in the introduction, a large part of the insurance business. But they occur in other markets. One is horseracing betting: winning tickets earn back a fraction of total bets in proportion to how much one bets on the winning horse. That is usually referred to as \pari-mutuel"-betting (Gabriel and Marsden 1990, Gulley and Scott 1989) . National lottery systems often have this feature as well. This suggests that further exploring the mechanism may be a worthwhile enterprise.
As a nal observation, we note that the outcome of the La Crema game preserves the relative level of wealth for all households. This contrasts with Young's (1998, p. 132) observation that \the most stable contractual arrangements are those that are e cient, and more or less egalitarian, given the parties' payo opportunities." An interesting question for future research would be to explain why, of all the possible e cient allocations, the actual mechanism in use results in (something close to) one that preserves the wealth ranking under this class of adverse contingencies.
In particular, when m = w = (w 1 ; : : : ; w n ), and letting W = P 
Suppose that for some i; j 2 N, w i 6 = w j . Then clearly w n > w 1 , implying that @Eu 1 @m 1 m=w < 0 and @Eun @mn m=w > 0. In words, the poorest (resp. the richest) household has strict incentives to underreport (resp. overreport) and w = (w 1 ; : : :; w n ) is not a Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game. If on the contrary w 1 = w n = w then for all i 2 N, 
